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GENERAL RESPONSES TO THE CONFERENCE

COMMENT
Milner S. Ball
"That's me in the corner. That's me in the spotlight, losing my religion1 ....-

D USSELL Pearce rendered good service in conceiving and proLXducing these deliberations. They have been a marvel of politics,
fund raising, management, and substantive interchange. He is due
thanks and congratulations for setting aside his individual agenda in
order to achieve this success of our common enterprise.
He asked that I serve as a commentator, and I am pleased to comply as an expression of appreciation for his fruitful labor. He assigned
four commentators, me included, to no particular working group. Instead, he asked that we wander, like Arameans, among them. In effect this has caused us to be marginalized, episodic, and disruptive of
the legal order. So did Professor Pearce-shrewd director-have us
act out symbolically the role of the believer in the practice and teaching of law.
In the rich exchanges I overheard in my rounds, I discerned four
approaches to the relation of religion and law taking shape. This is a
construction of what I heard and not a stenographer's report. Nor is it
a statement of Weberian or Niebuhrian types.
1. Worlds Apart
The first approach is premised on a fundamental division between
religious belief and a lawyer's practice (including teaching). This difference is expressed as a gap between faith and practice, the private
and the public, and the religious and the secular.
Its strategy lies not in attempting to bridge the gap but in equipping
the believer to work in the alien, less valued, secular practice of law.
To move from the spiritually rich world of religion to the bleak world
of law is a form of space travel. The believer has something to take
with her. She goes armed with faith, virtue, and morality. The believer must refresh and strengthen her beliefs during the time she inhabits the world of religion and renew her grasp of the morality that
will guide her in her life outside of worship. When she arrives in law,
she then consumes her spiritual stores in the work of applying the
moral rules and principles to the situations she encounters.
The focus of attention in this approach is the individual lawyer. Her
uprightness and goodness are the point. The question is how best to
1. R.E.M., Losing My Religion, on Out of Tune Warner Bros. Records 1991).
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fortify her virtue and then preserve it. One answer is to provide more
service to the believer during her withdrawal into the privacy of religion. Another is to press for greater recognition of religion in the
public world. The aim of the latter is to secure a larger area-a landing site or beachhead-within which believers need not continuously
face frontline assault by hostile forces during their term in service.
2.

No Great Difference I

According to the second view, there is no great divide between a
lawyer's life as a believer and her life in the practice of law because
the law and its practice are basically good. If there is some separation
between the two, this is no more than a disciplinary concern. The law
is God's work of justice in the world, and to practice it is to extend
one's practice of religion.
The strategy of the lawyer-believer is to strive for internal improvement of the law. While the work of the lawyer-believer does not make
the law perfectly pure, it at least makes it purer. She is to participate
robustly in the generation or amendment of rules and practices that
constitute law's ongoing reformation. She particularly enhances the
practice of her religion in doing so. The focus is not upon the believer,
but rather upon the system and how it can be made better.
3. No Great Difference II
Like the second approach, this one also assumes a fundamental
compatibility between religion and law but for a very different reason.
Law is not basically good. It is basically necessary. And it is necessary partly in consequence of the pathology of religion. Religion has a
capacity for types of conflict and oppression intolerable in a pluralistic, advanced, capitalist-democratic society. Law is a preferred means
of government and dispute settlement. The believer may engage in
law because law is neutral. The strategic hope is that her participation
in the legal system will improve both her and the law. She will grow
more sophisticated and tolerant. Law will become more inclusively
neutral. The focus is thus upon both the believer and the law and
upon cabining the capacity of each for cultural irritation.
4. None of the Above
The fourth approach views religion and law as equally fallen institutions. Their interrelations are ordinary. They are not qualitatively
different from the interrelations of, say, religion and politics or law
and business. The believer is free to participate, or not to participate,
in the one as in the other. In fact, the two may often be indistinguishable, as they are when they merge in the civic religion. A person is a
believer in the sense that she has been seized by the biblical stories
and may find that civic religion-the American blend of law, religion,
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self-improvement, politics, economics, and nationalism-can sometimes be idolatry. In that event her participation in law and in religion
will become complex and marked by either tentativeness, tension, or
both.
A believer does not carry with her certain beliefs, rules of morality
or anything like that to be applied in either law or religion. God precedes her in these institutions as He does in every corner of the fallen
world. He is there before she arrives. Her role is to discern His active
presence and to align herself with it. The uncertainties encourage
humility in the performance.
The focus is not upon either the believer or the system but upon the
presence of God and what He is doing. Because God typically exerts
pressure on the heap to put those at the bottom of it on the top and
those excluded from it in the middle, believers may find themselves in
distresses of the legal order-and of the religious and the religiouslegal orders as well. Believers may appear to be strangers.
Well, that is what I think I thought I heard all of you say. But my
statement of it is terribly abstract and therefore not an accurate reflection of the way you spoke. What you did was to tell stories. One of
them was Frank Pommersheim's account of his practice of law in Indian country. Now if you are unfamiliar with the magnitude of wreckage that law and religion and the two together can produce, you
should examine the extended example of the history and present status of relationships between the United States and the Indian tribes.
Not the least instructive, humbling element of it is the fact that the
damage arises from religion and law at their best and from the sincerest of commitments to God and civilization.
Frank told us movingly about entering Indian country to do as a
lawyer what its inhabitants were willing to have him do. When he
finished his story, one of us in the audience asked about his religion.
He said that he is a practicing Catholic but that he had not attended
mass during his time on the reservation.
He did not say so, but it seemed to me that he had risked both
himself and his beliefs. He had been sharing with a people the dispossession of their land by law and the dispossession of their beliefs by
Christendom. Or so I thought.2

2. In response to a draft of this comment, Frank offered a caveat: "Any number
of Native people identify as and by any definition are authentic Christians. This may
or may not be ironic, but it is certainly a reality I do not deny." He also offered a
disclaimer: "I attach no particular significance to my actions. They were offered as
narrative without any thought as to meaning. I meant to claim no high ground. There
is quite enough of that in the world already."
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I heard no stories about William Stringfellow and was genuinely
surprised that I did not.' But I did catch resonances of his voice in
Frank's comments. Frank's sojourn in Indian country was not unlike
Bill's in East Harlem. The conjunction of the two called to mind Bill's
remark: "I continue to be haunted by the ironic impression that I'4may
have to renounce being a lawyer, the better to be an advocate."
And I wondered-I could neither resolve it nor put it out of mindwhether Bill hadn't also been haunted by the impression that he might
sometimes have to renounce his religion for the same reason. I mean
his religion and not the Word that unfailingly upheld him.
Like Frank and Bill-and, if I understood correctly the comments
offered to us by the adherents of Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and
Native American religions, like those commentators as well-I remain
mystified at the energy invested in wrestling over whether religion is
relevant to the practice of law. Religion and law belong equally to the
fallen world in which we believers live penultimately. The urgency to
me is how to live in, but not of, this world and all its institutions.
Is it not our vocation, like Frank's and Bill's, to wait expectantly in
the world? Is it not that our doing so requires mutual critique and
encouragement from time to time? Is it not that one form of this
judgment and mercy is borne to us by each other with our stories?
And is it not that such an interchange has been a welcome value of
our gathering here at Fordham Law School?

3. I was told that he had emerged in the conversation of one working group that I
missed.
4. Andrew McThenia, An Uneasy Relationship with the Law, in Radical Christian
and Exemplary Lawyer 167 (Andrew McThenia and William Stringfellow, eds. 1995).

